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Beyond Creativity:
Copyright as Knowledge Law
Michael J. Madison*
ABSTRACT

The Supreme Court's copyright jurisprudence of the last 100
years has embraced the creativity trope. Spurred in part by themes
associatedwith the story of "romanticauthorship"in the 19th and 20th
centuries, copyright critiques likewise ask, "Who is creative?" "How
should creativity be protected (or not) and encouraged (or not)?" and
"Why protect creativity?" Policy debates and scholarship in recent
years have focused on the concept of creativity in framing copyright
disputes, transactions, and institutions, reinforcing the notion that
these are the central copyright questions. I suggest that this focus on
the creativity trope is unhelpful. I argue that digital technologies and
the explosion of amateur art challenge the usefulness of creativity as
the organizingprinciple for copyright law. I propose that knowledge
should be restored as copyright's core concept. I illustrate that
argument with the art and writing of Vincent van Gogh, who is often
used to illustrate the idea of the prototypically creative author, and I
draw out some implications from the proposal in terms of legal
doctrines that relate to producing, distributing,conserving, accessing,
and sharingknowledge.

Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research, University of Pittsburgh School of
Law. J.D., Stanford Law School, 1987; B.A., Political Science, Yale University, 1983. Email:
madison@pitt.edu. Copyright 2010 Michael J. Madison. Thanks to the organizers of the
conference at Vanderbilt University Law School in October 2009 at which an early version of this
paper was presented, and thanks to the participants in that conference for their thoughtful
comments.
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Shepard Fairey copied a photograph of candidate Barack
Obama, changed its coloring, enhanced its shading, added some
campaign iconography, and created one of the singular images of the
2008 race for the American presidency: the Hope poster.1 For his
efforts, Fairey was sued for copyright infringement by the Associated
Press, which claimed a copyright in the photograph. 2 Did the Hope
poster infringe, or was it excused as a matter of fair use? Reasonable
people differ.
The Fairey dispute illustrates how copyright's conceptual tools
are being exhausted by the intersection of art, technology, and
culture-if those tools were ever adequate to begin with. When I
teach copyright law, I show the original Obama photograph and the
Obama Hope poster to my students.
Even before we get to a
discussion of whether the former is copyrightable or the latter
infringes, their reaction is this: Anyone could have produced the
Obama Hope poster using some cheap or even free software. Fairey is
no artist.3 And anyone could have taken the Obama photograph. How
is that art?
These are intuitive reactions that precede formal legal
analysis, but they point to key topics in copyright. The photograph is
copyrightable if it is "original," that is, if it constitutes "expression" of
an "author."4 The poster is more likely to be noninfringing if it is

1.
The "Obama Hope" poster that is the centerpiece of the litigation is a derivative of a
hand-finished stencil collage, which is itself based on a prior "Obama Progress" screen print
produced by Fairey. See The Giant, Obama Progress, http://www.thegiant.orgwiki/index.php/
Obama Progress (last visited Apr. 9, 2010; see also The Giant, Obama Hope Stencil Collage on
Paper, http://www.thegiant.org/wiki/index.php/ObamaHope-StencilCollage-onPaper
(last
visited Apr. 9, 2010).
2.
The lawsuit and the events that led up to it are described, with copies of the relevant
images, in Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality,31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 451-54 (2009).
3.
In fact, Fairey is a professional artist, though he and his work are controversial. See
The Giant, Shepard Fairey, http://www.thegiant.orglwiki/index.php/ShepardFairey (last visited
Apr. 9, 2010). The students' reaction is to the Obama Hope poster, not to the stencil collage.
4.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
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"transformative."5 On both sides of the equation, intuition and the
law coincide in a search for creativity. My students are unimpressed
by the creativity alleged by both sides in this case.
The conceptual exhaustion at work here is the failure of
creativity as a concept to help observers differentiate things that
copyright values and protects from things that copyright excludes and
things that copyright penalizes. Fairey and his poster are merely
notable examples. Similar difficulties afflict audio and video works,
particularly those produced with inexpensive digital technology, 6 and
7
in so-called "fact-based" works that collect and distribute bits of data.
In each of these contexts, the law struggles to deal with the core
"what?" issues of copyright law: what should the law protect, and what
should it not protect? In both cases, why?
To all outward appearances, creativity is the undisputed
"what?" of copyright. The proposition that creativity is the very point
of copyright is reflected throughout copyright doctrine. The effective
8
scope of copyright has always been limited to an author's "expression"
and has been grounded formally since 1991 in the proposition that
copyright protection attaches to any original work of authorship that
displays a "modicum" of that close cousin of expression, "creativity."9
Some courts require that copyrightable derivative works, adapted
from earlier sources, display even larger dollops of creativity than
"ordinary" works must, so that copyright law can distinguish between
copyrightable new works and separately copyrightable or public
domain predecessors. 10 A copyrighted work is more likely to succeed
against a fair use defense if the work is deemed to be "creative;" a

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 587 (1994); see also 17 U.S.C. § 107
5.
(2006).
See Daniel Gervais, The Tangled Web of UGC: Making Copyright Sense of User6.
Generated Content, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841, 845-46 (2009) (describing the challenges for
copyright law posed by so-called "User- Generated Content").
7.
See Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and Creativity, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 169, 186-89
(2008) (criticizing use of the "creativity" framework to analyze copyrightability of numbers for
fasteners).
8.
"Expression" appears in quotation marks partly because the reference is to
"expression" as a copyright term of art. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (identifying the subject
matter of copyright as works of authorship fixed in tangible media of expression). "Expression"
as a term of art is linked closely to colloquial usage of the term "expression." Additionally, the
term "expression" appears in quotation marks to denote the distinction between the colloquial
meaning of expression and the colloquial meaning of expression and the use of expression as a
term of art in the Copyright Act.
9.
See Feist Pub'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-47 (1991).
10.
Entm't Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1218-20
(9th Cir. 1997); Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 303-05 (7th Cir. 1983); see 17 U.S.C. §
106(2) (2006).

VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 12:4:817

work accused of infringement is more likely to be acquitted as fair use
if it is labeled "transformative"-that is, if it is creative.1 1 The law's
emphasis on creativity is premised on the idea, sometimes explicit and
often implicit in law, policy, and culture, that creativity is not merely
an individual and a social good, but the definitive good of its
intangible kind, the highest and best use to which a human mind may
be put.12
The United States Constitution links copyright with
promoting "Progress."1 3 Pursuing creativity, in the judgment of the
Supreme Court, is the legal strategy that copyright adopts to achieve
14
that goal.
As creativity law, copyright is oversold.
The ubiquity of
copyright and the ubiquity of creativity suggest that society has more
creativity law than it needs. It needs more of something else. I
suggest that copyright should be reconsidered as a species of
knowledge law.
Why? Creativity may never have been more widespread than
it is today. Consider the following dose of history. Traditional
hierarchies of producing, distributing, and consuming creative and
expressive products were based on scarcity: the scarcity of training in
the disciplines of creative production, the scarcity of access to the tools
and technologies of creative production, and the scarcity of creative
goods themselves. 15 Viewed from the supply side, only some people
could be called "artists" or "creators," whether they were supported by
patrons, by firms, or by their own labors. Only some people had access
to printing presses, to paint and canvas, to movie cameras, or even to
computers. Only modest numbers of copies of creative products were
produced. Viewed from the consumption side, audiences and
consumers collectively (if implicitly) understood all of those things; the
best evidence typically lay in the work of "creativity" itself. One had

11.
See Campbell, 510 U.S. 569.
12.
That statement offers strong rhetoric, but that rhetoric is consistent with popular
writing that valorizes creativity as the key to the human soul and to human prosperity and as
the most complex of brain processes. See, e.g., DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE CREATORS: A HISTORY OF
HEROES OF THE IMAGINATION (1992); RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS: AND
How IT'S TRANSFORMING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2002); STEVEN
PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS (1997).
13.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl. 8.
14.
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50.
15.
See generally Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123
HARV. L. REV. 809 (2010) (describing in greater detail the social and technological shifts to which
the text refers).
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only to look at the work (or to hear it) to discern the investment of
creative resources that it represented.16
Today, in contrast to that stylized and condensed history, many
of those sources of scarcity, if not all of them, have fallen away.
Socially, culturally, and legally, the world exhibits a plenitude of
creativity. 17
On philosophical grounds, economic grounds, and
technological grounds, it has never been easier for anyone to create, to
access the tools of creation, and to make creative works accessible to
enormous numbers of people, via copies and otherwise.1 8 "Amateur
art," which is creativity produced by all kinds of people and for all
kinds of reasons, is on the rise.1 9
Professor Daniel Gervais
characterizes amateur art as creativity that is as public and as
potentially commercial as professional art. 20
This plenitude of

16.
Feist itself emphasizes that a work of authorship is copyrightable if, through its
appearance, it possesses minimal creativity. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; see also GRANT
MCCRACKEN, CULTURE AND CONSUMPTION 68 (1988) (concluding that an object is "an unusually
cunning and oblique device for the representation of fundamental cultural truths"); Laura A.
Heymann, A Tale of (at Least) Two Authors: Focusing Copyright Law on Processover Product, 34
J. CORP. L. 1009, 1021 (2009) (noting copyright's insistence on evaluating the work of authorship
itself). Departures from this standard are noteworthy for their infrequency. See Brandir Int'l,
Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding in the context of
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works that copyrightability should turn on the relationship
between the work and the process of industrial design).
17.
The relevant world in this context is the developed Western world. Cf. Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Wealth Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472, 1497 (2007) (reviewing YOCHAI
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND
FREEDOM (2006)) (arguing that emerging forms of "social" production-a close cousin of broad
"amateur" creativity-depend on the existence of excess capacity to produce possessed by
individuals).
18.
See YOCHAi BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006). Because of his commitment to liberal political
philosophy, Benkler at times advances a distinctly traditional view of authorship within his
manifesto for peer production. Networks are valuable, in his view, because they enable the
fulfillment of the idea that all of us, as individuals, are authors of our own lives and manifest
maximal autonomy with respect to our creations, i.e., our selves. See id. at 9. In the broad sense
of determining the paths of our lives, in other words, we are all creators, all the time. See also
Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1182,
1190-91 (2007) (linking the idea of individual freedom to engage in "creative play" with cultural
objects with the idea of self-constitution).
19.
I choose the term "amateur art" partly because it is catchier than cousins with more
popular currency, such as "User-Generated Content," and partly because it does not project the
proposition that the legal and social questions that it poses are solely or even primarily
economic. No term is bias-free. As "amateur art" is used in the text, the term intentionally
obscures the line between the amateur artist who does not produce art for a living and the
professional artist who does. The focus on amateur art evokes equally challenging questions of
copyright-based line-drawing in conceptual art and appropriation art. See Laura A. Heymann,
Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 46062 (2008).
20.
See Gervais, supranote 6, at 844-46.
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creativity is in many ways a wonderful thing, but it comes at a cost:
the work of authorship itself is no longer a reliable guide to its
creative value, culturally or legally.
Shepard Fairey's Hope poster illustrates this difficulty. The
poster may not be amateur art, but, as my students asked, how can
one tell? The ubiquity of creativity in copyright leads lawyers, judges,
scholars, and even students to investigate proxies for creativity. The
"who?" of copyright substitutes for the "what?" of copyright. 2 1 Who is a
creator for purposes of copyright law, and how should that person or
enterprise be defined and recognized, whether the topic is authors who
own copyrights in the first instance, publishers and other
intermediaries who distribute works of authorship, or producers of
noninfringing adaptations and reuses of original works? Who among
those needs the incentive to create or distribute that copyright
provides? Who would create new works regardless of that incentive
and, absent copyright, avoid imposing on society the social costs that
accompany legal protection for creativity? 22 As my students asked
indirectly, is Shepard Fairey an amateur artist, or a professional? Is
he an author, or is he a new user? Both? The work itself yields few
clues, if any.
These are examples of "who?" analysis, which follows from the
Supreme Court's minimalist approach to copyright as creativity law.
As creativity has become the "what?" of copyright, pursuing creativity
as copyright's subject and object has given lawyers, policymakers,
scholars, and even creators themselves a weak conceptual vocabulary
for addressing hard questions in the digital age. Fairey and his poster
are only partly representative of the problem. The broader challenge
is this: if everyone is a creator and if everything is creative, then there
is little reason to dispute the conclusion that all things and all people
should be well-blanketed by copyright-or that none should be.
Copyright law includes a small set of tools for metering legal
protection based on types of creativity, 23 but copyright's intentionally

21.
The "who?" and the "how?" of creative production in traditional hierarchies may have
overlapped historically with the "what?" of creativity, but today those variables often operate
independently, or more independently, than in the past.
22.
See Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513 (2009). See generally Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship
Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186
(2008).
23.
Copyright contains a handful of policy levers within the creativity construct. See,
e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2006) (describing "the nature of the copyrighted work" as a factor to
account for in fair use cases); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)
(establishing the idea of "thin" copyright for fact-based works).
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weak way of asking "what?" has given the law a set of unsatisfying
"who?" questions.
This combined weak sense of "what?" and inadequate sense of
"who?" has provoked a lot of recent commentary. Some scholars have
tried to refine copyright's originality principle (the origin of the
24
creativity trope) by referring to patent's non-obviousness standard.
Others have sought to contextualize creativity in copyright in order to
build a more robust vocabulary keyed to the "who?" and "how?" of
creativity. 25 One scholar has proposed saving creativity by linking it
more expressly to the economics of market failure. 26 Some scholars
have sought to redefine copyright in institutional or structural terms,
although that institutional premise leads to new "who?" responses. In
that vein, Professor Robert Merges argues that the rise of "collective
creativity," or creativity expressed in a variety of informal group
settings, suggests the need for copyright to develop a framework for
"group IP rights" to accompany what he regards as copyright's historic
and appropriate solicitude for "creative professionals." 27 Professor
Neil Netanel argues that copyright does too much to protect
professional producers and far too little to enable small creators,
independents, and amateurs who contribute so much to society's
28
expressive diversity.
I join this group of scholars in examining the law through an
institutional lens, but I offer a different premise. I do not want to save
creativity. I want to marginalize it. More-more creativity, more
creative goods, more creators-is not necessarily better; more is
merely different. More can be socially or individually harmful; more
can be wasteful. 29 Creativity, as a way to assess the strengths and
weaknesses of this system and particular acts within it, and as a basis
24.
See Miller, supra note 2, at 485. Patent law itself is tempted by the sirens of
creativity. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). Rejecting the notion that the
"ordinary artisan" standard in patent law should be applied woodenly, leaving the door open to
patents on inventions that inventors with common sense in the relevant technical art would
recognize as obvious, the Supreme Court wrote, "[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of
ordinary creativity." Id. at 421.
25.
See generally Cohen, supra note 18.
26.
See Karjala, supra note 7. For a related argument that ties a sliding originality and
creativity scale in copyright to the incentives that the copyright system is meant to provide, see
Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1505 (2009). A broader effort to
situate copyrightable creativity in an economic model defined by a limited monopoly theme is
represented by Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009).
27.
Robert P. Merges, Locke for the Masses: Property Rights and the Products of
Collective Creativity, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1179, 1187-89 (2009); Robert P. Merges, The Concept of
Property in the DigitalEra, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1239, 1273 (2008).
28.

NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 81-108 (2008).

29.

See Beebe, supra note 15, at 69-77.
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for the social organization constructed in part by copyright, cannot
carry the weight it has been assigned. Even in cultural and social
context, and even in the institutional proposals of Merges and
Netanel, the "who?" and "how?" of copyright, the questions prompted
by copyright's focus on creativity, slight the "what?" of copyright.
Instead, those questions lead to theories of behavior. Copyright as
creativity law becomes a way of thinking about motivation, influence,
and power, rather than a way of thinking about what sorts of things
society wants to produce, preserve, share, and have access to.
I argue that the concept of knowledge should be rehabilitated
as an anchor for copyright, and perhaps for all law dealing with
products of the mind and hand. 30 Copyright debates often simply
assume creativity as a goal. 31 But the concept of secular creativity has
32
little traction in law or in literature prior to the nineteenth century.
Is there a better alternative? Can reopening the question of "what?"
give copyright a better set of conceptual tools? What should the law
protect, and why? 33 My answer is that although creativity should not
be excluded from copyright, copyright should be conceived primarily as
a system for producing, distributing, conserving, sharing, and
ensuring access to knowledge.
From the standpoint of the legal system, using knowledge as a
conceptual framework for copyright has some important advantages
over creativity. The most important of these is that knowledge is
difficult, while creativity is comparatively easy. For legal purposes,
society has a reasonably good grasp of what creativity is and where
creativity comes from. Creativity is the art of the new, and it is the

30.
On the latter point, this piece is related to Michael J. Madison, Creativity and Craft,
in CREATIVITY, LAW, AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (Robin Paul Malloy & Shubha Ghosh eds.,
forthcoming 2010), and Michael J. Madison, Notes on a Geography of Knowledge, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2039 (2009).
31.
See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928
(2005) (describing copyright as an exercise in managing "a sound balance between the respective
values of supporting creative pursuits through copyright protection and promoting innovation in
new communication technologies by limiting the incidence of liability for copyright
infringement"); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) (noting that "the grant of exclusive
rights to their respective writings and discoveries is intended to encourage the creativity of
'Authors and Inventors").
32.
See Paul Oskar Kristeller, "Creativity"and "Tradition,"44J. HIST. IDEAS 105 (1983).
33.
See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, It's an Original! C.): In Pursuit of Copyright's
Elusive Essence, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187, 189 (2005). Neil Netanel's recent book is an
ambitious attempt to combine the "who?," "what?," and "why?" of copyright under the rubric of
free expression principles and their connection to democratic self-government found in the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See NETANEL, supra note 28.
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product of the individual mind. 34 As new creativity takes form, that
cognitive premise intersects with investigations into material culture
and social practice, including arguments over whether people create
36
for love or for money,3 5 whether and when creativity is cumulative,
and whether and when creativity is collective.3 7 Copyright gets
traction at this point, both legally and culturally. It absorbs and
reflects questions framed by the creativity construct. By comparison,
knowledge is difficult. Philosophers have been arguing for centuries
over the nature of knowledge. In the last one hundred years, their
questions were joined by those of economists and sociologists. 3 8 Little
of these investigations, that is, knowledge about knowledge, have
made their way into copyright law, or even into intellectual property
law generally.
Because knowledge is relatively difficult, copyright as
knowledge law offers a landscape of opportunity. Lawmakers and
policymakers can wrestle with challenging questions of line-drawing
in copyright by asking and answering questions about the role of
knowledge in society, rather than solely by trying to map accepted
The very fact that
wisdom about creativity to new situations.
knowledge about knowledge is hard may, surprisingly, help
policymakers find better answers to copyright's amateur art
challenges than they have found so far in the comparatively easy
landscape of creativity.
Part I of this Article briefly recalls the conceptual and doctrinal
landscape of creativity in copyright. This material is mostly familiar
to copyright lawyers and scholars, as it follows the emergence of the
creativity theme in law and literature since the mid-1850s. That
emergence is often connected with an argument about authorship in
copyright. This Part suggests some ways in which restoring a focus on
knowledge opens a conceptual landscape that is related to but distinct
from the newer landscape of creativity. Part II explores the heart of
the creativity/knowledge question with an illustration grounded in the
authorship trope, the work of Vincent van Gogh. This Part explores
See, e.g., MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
34.
DISCOVERY AND INVENTION (1996); THE NATURE OF CREATIVITY: CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGICAL

PERSPECTIVES (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1988).
See Tushnet, supra note 22.
35.
See Cohen, supra note 18. The law may have a reasonably good sense of creativity,
36.
but that sense is far from perfect, or uncontested. See Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of
Intellectual Property, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319 (2008).
See Merges, Locke for the Masses, supra note 27.
37.
38.

See, e.g., FRITZ MACHLUP, THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN

THE UNITED STATES (1962) (collecting information on the economics of the so-called knowledge
industry).
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what it means to put knowledge at the center of copyright law. Part
III looks at copyright doctrine and its applications of copyright to
amateur art and digital technology that might make more sense (or be
more or less persuasive) in a framework specified by copyright as
knowledge law.
Part IV concludes with some implications for
copyright law and scholarship.

I. FROM KNOWLEDGE TO CREATIVITY
What do I mean by the term "knowledge"? The following broad
definition of knowledge serves as a starting point:
There is the philosopher's knowledge: justified true belief, propositional knowledge, and
knowledge how and knowledge of, all of which require careful delineation of
justification, truth, and belief. There is the other philosopher's knowledge, phenomenal
knowledge, which is not wholly distinct from our experience of the world. Law and
policy speak of knowledge in broader, looser, and more general terms, with a small '"
rather than a big "K," perhaps. Knowledge in the small "k" sense includes information
about the world and ourselves, various forms and practices of art and science (in both
classical and modern senses), tools for knowing (reason and belief), as well as the
diverse products of knowing. This small "k"knowledge includes fiction, film, secrets, and
39
computer programs.

That broad beginning is needed because knowledge, in both
copyright law and in public policy generally, has lived a primitive
existence.
Knowledge is both new and old. It is tangible and
intangible, explicit and tacit. 40
Knowledge is cumulative and
collective. Knowledge starts off both inside us and out in the world.
Generating, distributing, storing, ensuring access to and benefiting
from knowledge requires opportunity, effort, and investment. All of
those things take place in suitable institutional environments, such as
the environments supplied and promoted by copyright and patent law,
as well as in the minds and at the hands of individuals.
Once upon a time, at the dawn of modern copyright, that
institutional perspective on knowledge informed the kernel of
copyright law. Policymakers referred to the scope and purpose of the
law as "learning"41 and sometimes as "Science." 42 Those terms, while

39.
See Madison, Notes on a Geography of Knowledge, supra note 30, at 2043.
40.
For discussion of distinctions among tacit and explicit knowledge, and conceptual
and tangible knowledge, see, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge
Codification, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1009 (2008); Robin Cowan, Paul A. David & Dominique
Foray, The Explicit Economics of Knowledge Codification and Tacitness, 9 INDUS. & CORP.
CHANGE 211 (2000); Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things,
56 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 381 (2005).
41.
"Learning" as copyright's framework comes from the Statute of Anne, which begins
with the following preamble: "An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies
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a little archaic, are helpful in the present context, particularly because
they suggest that the idea of copyright as knowledge law is grounded
initially in copyright's origins in the Statute of Anne 43 and the United
States Constitution. 44 Knowledge as it is described above is a modern
analog, though not quite a synonym. Eighteenth and early nineteenth
century copyright was limited in scope and modest in ambition.
English statutory copyright began with books; in the United States,
45
the first copyright statute covered maps, charts, and books.
Copyright began as a mechanism to ensure that authors and
publishers had an economic motivation to teach people about their
world: who and where they were, where they had come from, and
where they were going, both literally and metaphorically. 46 The word
Copyright's teaching function was
"teach" is used intentionally.
shared by patent law. Even today, patent retains a strong connection
to its own roots as a species of knowledge law, by insisting that
patents may be granted on inventions so long as the patent
disciplines
specification adequately "teaches" relevant technological
47
how to practice the advance that is to be patented.
Modern scholars and even modern courts have not forgotten
copyright's knowledge roots-at least not entirely. In Harper & Row,
Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court noted that
"copyright is intended to increase and not to impede the harvest of
knowledge." 48 In a recent article, Professor Peter Menell traced the
history of copyright as a species of knowledge law in analyzing
of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein
mentioned." Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
The Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
42.
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8,cl. 8.
See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
43.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8. Continental copyright systems, whose solicitude for
44.
authors is often contrasted with the economic orientation of Anglo-American copyright, was
likewise grounded initially in the concept of knowledge. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale
of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary Franceand America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991
(1990) (contrasting early American and French copyright systems).
The works most frequently registered in copyright in early America were textbooks,
45.
manuals, atlases, and directories. See James Gilreath, American Literature, Public Policy, and
the Copyright Laws Before 1800, in FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS 1790-1800, xv, xv (James
Gilreath ed., 1987). Copyright's "useful" origins are recounted in Bracha, supra note 22, at 20924.

46.

See Dotan Oliar, The (Constitutional)Convention on IP:A New Reading, 57 UCLA L.

REV. 421 (2009).
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting
47.
that "to be enabling, the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make
and use the full scope of the claimed invention without 'undue experimentation"').
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985).
48.
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Google's Book Search digitization project. 49
Professor Pamela
Samuelson used a different meaning of knowledge in analyzing the
seminal case of Baker v. Selden,50 often cited for the proposition that
copyright protects expression but not ideas, as a translation of the
principle that copyright cannot be used to monopolize knowledge. 51
But most observers have tended to take copyright's contemporary
relationship to knowledge for granted, pausing at the concept on their
way to bigger prey like "progress" 52 and "expression. 53 Beyond
copyright, decades of policymaking have not refined the relationship
between law and knowledge. Modern policymakers develop and rely
on new knowledge-based catchphrases-the knowledge economy, 54
traditional knowledge,5 5 and access to knowledge 56-with little settled
understanding of what they mean or what questions they are meant to
pose or answer.
Given this background, how did copyright become a law of
creativity? In a history that is now familiar to copyright lawyers,
what is sometimes called the authorship critique displaced knowledge
as the governing framework for copyright law and, over the course of a
century, replaced it with creativity. Some of the transition owes its
origins and progress to an ideology of creative authorship that
developed among nineteenth-century critics who advocated for

49.
See Peter S. Menell, Knowledge Accessibility and PreservationPolicy for the Digital
Age, 44 Hous. L. REV. 1013 (2007). Menell's approach is grounded in an account of the legal
system's historical affinity for knowledge preservation and access to knowledge. See id. at 101939.
50.
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
51.
See Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processesfrom
the Scope of Its Protection,85 TEX. L. REV. 1921 (2007).
52.
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) (noting that the grant of exclusive
rights for limited times serves "the ultimate purpose of promoting the "Progress of Science and
useful Arts"); Margaret Chon, Postmodern 'Progress" Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent
Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97 (1993) (arguing that the constitutional purpose of copyright should
be guided by the importance of access to knowledge as a fundamental value).
53.
See L. Ray Patterson & Stanley F. Birch, Jr., A Unified Theory of Copyright, 46
HOUS. L. REV. 215 (2009). Lawrence Lessig's recent popular manifesto, FREE CULTURE: How BIG
MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
(2004), which rhetorically conflates knowledge, creativity, culture, and expression as objects and
subjects of copyright, is a helpful example.
54.
See Communication from the Commission." Copyright in the Knowledge Economy,
COM (2009) 532 final (Oct. 19, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/copyright/
docs/copyright-infso/20091019_532_en.pdf.
55.
See Stephen R. Munzer & Kal Raustiala, The Uneasy Case for Intellectual Property
Rights in TraditionalKnowledge, 27 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37 (2009).
56.
See Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008).
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expanded legal protection for authors. 57 Some of the transition owes
its origins to enterprises advancing a legal agenda framed by a
creativity-based concept of originality, in order to bury authors, so to
speak, rather than to praise them.58 Justice Story's opinion in Folsom
v. Marsh,59 establishing the rudiments of the modern fair use doctrine,
has been characterized in those terms, as has the Supreme Court's
more recent opinion in International News Service v. Associated
Press,60 which established the "hot news" misappropriation doctrine as
a limited exception to the exclusion of facts from copyright.
Importantly, International News Service drew a distinction between
the news and the literary form in which it was expressed. 61 In that
case, as well as in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,62 and
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,63 the Court effectively
defined copyright as creativity law, both technically (in terms of the
"authorship" that Congress was authorized to protect through
64
copyright) and rhetorically.
The case that represents the apotheosis of copyright as
65
creativity law is Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service.
According to the Court in Feist, the subject matter of copyright is
broad, that broad field is defined by an author's creativity, and
virtually no true creativity is required to qualify a work as
copyrightable. Originality is a constitutional requirement, the Court
held, and "[o]riginal, as the term is used in copyright, means only that
the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to
copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal
57.

See Carla Hesse, The Rise of Intellectual Property, 700 B.C.-A.D. 2000: An Idea in the

Balance, DAEDALUS, Spring 2002, at 26, 35; Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The
Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 459 (1991); Martha Woodmansee, The
Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the 'Author," 17
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984), reprinted in THE AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET:
REREADING THE HISTORY OF AESTHETICS 49-55 (1994).

58.
See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
See L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v. Marsh and Its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431,
59.
434-35 (1998).
248 U.S. 215 (1918).
60.

See Robert Brauneis, The Transformation of Originality in the Progressive-Era
61.
Debate over Copyright in News, 27 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321, 370 (2009).
111 U.S. 53 (1884).
62.
188 U.S. 239 (1903).
63.
64.
See Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58 (characterizing "writings" in the constitutional
authorization to enact a copyright statute as all forms "by which the ideas in the mind of the
author are given visible expression"); see also Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250 ("The copy [the original
work] is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality always contains
something unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of
art has in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone.").
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
65.
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degree of creativity."66 Feist's discussion of creativity is technically
dicta, but Feist has nonetheless made it effectively mandatory for
policymakers and advocates to frame copyright arguments in
creativity terms. The minimal creativity threshold ensures that those
arguments are constrained meaningfully in few ways. 67 Facts and
ideas themselves remain beyond copyright's pale; 68 in that sense there
is a synthesis of copyright as creativity law (facts and ideas are not
"creative") and copyright as knowledge law (facts and ideas
form a
body of knowledge that remains free to all). Is a compilation of fact,
the work at issue in Feist, protectable by copyright? The statute
provides that it is, so long as the underlying materials are "selected,
coordinated, or arranged" in a way that is original-that is, minimally
69
creative.
But "creativity" in Feist's sense gives advocates and courts few
tools for distinguishing what is, and what is not, creative. Creativity
is mostly binary, and as a legal standard, that binary is substantively
impotent. Works pass the creativity threshold if they reflect anything
beyond standard or automatic selections, and if they rely on nonfunctional
considerations.7 0
Creativity therefore
misleads.
Particularly in compilation cases, the focus on creativity leads
advocates and courts into positions where creativity plays both a
rhetorical role and a substantive role that is divorced from the
competition concerns that are characteristically driving these cases.7 1
Though Feist deals with copyrightable subject matter,
creativity themes in fair use cases and in cases involving derivative
works suffer comparable weaknesses. In fair use case law, which now
emphasizes the "transformative" character of works accused of
infringement, courts perform legal contortions to persuade themselves
that
verbatim
reproductions
of
copyrighted
works
are
transformative.7 2 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has retreated
from its earlier statement that a derivative work may be protected by

66.

Id. at 345.

67.
68.
69.
70.

See
See
See
See

Zimmerman, supranote 33.
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347-49 (1991).
17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (definition of compilation), 103 (2006).
Karjala, supra note 7, at 185-200.

71.
See id.
72.
See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006)
(holding that the defendant's use of the plaintiffs copyrighted concert poster images in a book
collecting and critiquing the artworks was "transformatively different from the images' original
expressive purpose"); see also Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things Change the Less
They Seem 'Transformed" Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y U.S.A. 251
(1998).
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copyright only if it displays a heightened measure of originality.7 3
Nearly anything can be creatively original, even a derivative work,
and nearly anything can be transformative. In amateur art and
digital contexts, creativity is incapable of performing the institutional
and structural functions that scholars of nearly all stripes believe
copyright should perform 74-distinguishing what should protected and
encouraged from what should or need not be. Yet copyright as
creativity law has become so all-encompassing that even skeptics of
copyright's modern expansion have adopted it in the name of the
75
Creative Commons movement and licensing scheme.
If creativity has exhausted itself conceptually, why turn to
knowledge as a complement, if not a substitute? History and tradition
are useful starting points. Copyright began as knowledge law, 76 and
knowledge law it should remain. Congressional power to devise
copyright and patent law remains tied to the goal of promoting
"Progress of Science and the Useful Arts." 77 History and tradition are
also guides to copyright as knowledge law in normative terms. Law
and culture may have lurched toward creativity, but knowledge as a
normative subject and object did not change. The normative power of
the thinking that went into the first copyright statutes, for example,
In the words of George Washington:
remains undiminished.
"Knowledge is in every country the surest basis of public happiness. In
one in which the measures of government receive their impression so
immediately from the sense of the community as in ours, it is
78
proportionately essential."
Washington was making an instrumental claim about the
relationship between knowledge and democratic self-government that
echoes today both in the intuition that culture and governance are tied
to one another and, more concretely, in Professor Netanel's work on
the role of copyright in American democracy. 79 The normative value of
knowledge might be instrumental in an entirely different sense. Even
See Schrock v. Learning Curve Int'l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2009). The court
73.
rejected the proposition that derivative work copyrights are subject to a "heightened originality"
standard, usually associated with Gracen v.Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983),
but preserved the proposition that derivative work copyrights subsist only in works that display
a "distinguishable variation" from their source.
See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (describing prescriptions of Robert
74.
Merges and Neil Netanel).

75.
See Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
76.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
77.
78.
See Patterson & Birch, Jr., supra note 53, at 229-30 (quoting George Washington).
See NETANEL, supra note 28, at 105-06 (building the promotion of knowledge into his
79.
model of copyright and the First Amendment).
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if knowledge were not tied specifically to self-governance, the
Baconian tradition of experimental science aligned knowledge with
improving the human condition, a premise that informs both modern
copyright and patent law.80 As Professor William Fisher has explored
in the context of the fair use doctrine, ethical claims tie knowledge (in
Fisher's argument, framed as education) to a broad range of
conceptions of the good life.81 The virtue of knowledge need not be
instrumental. Long-standing philosophical traditions lay claims to
knowledge as a good in itself.8 2
This argument does not rest solely on the claim that knowledge
should be idealized as a good in itself; rather, it embraces the
normative value of knowledge both as a good in itself and as
something that can be shared and used. The argument in total can be
recast as the proposition that copyright should be informed by its
status as knowledge law because individuals ought to be seeking
knowledge for themselves and ought to be producing, distributing,
sharing, storing, and conserving knowledge so that others can know.
This ought includes knowledge of the self, knowledge of others,
knowledge of the world, and, importantly, knowledge of things that
are not yet known.8 3 Not all knowledge is good knowledge;8 4
knowledge can cause harm, and confidentiality and secrecy are valid
normative goals under some circumstances. At bottom, however, it is
the case that copyright's historical resonance with knowledge has a
normative basis that is independent of history and tradition.
If copyright as creativity law offers a weak conceptual
vocabulary for analyzing the issues that copyright has been tasked
with, and if copyright as knowledge law has a defensible historical
basis and a strong normative foundation, then does copyright as
knowledge law offer a strong conceptual vocabulary? It has the
potential to do so. To make copyright work as a species of knowledge
law, policymakers, judges, lawyers, and scholars-not to mention
individuals, groups, and firms participating in activities that engage
80.

See Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts: American

Patent Law and Administration, 1787-1836 (Part2), 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 11, 35
(1998).
81.
See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1659, 1709-10 (1988).

82.

See Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative State,

157 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2031-32 (2009) (describing the normative benefits of the knowledge
embodied in mechanical inventions, whether or not they are commercialized).
83.
In other words, the normative value of knowledge lies in what is unknown, and what
society searches for, as much as it lies in what is known.
84.
For an interesting analysis of the virtues of ignorance, see Christian Turner, The
Burden of Knowledge, 43 GA. L. REV. 297 (2009).
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copyright questions-have to generate that vocabulary by exploring a
range of conceptual issues and questions. Knowledge, in other words,
is difficult.8 5 The concept of knowledge both offers and requires
answering a wide range of questions about how that concept should be
translated into policy, doctrine, and practice. Those questions include
the following:
The language of knowledge law: The dominant metaphor for intellectual property today
is ownership. 86 When and how can knowledge be owned? By whom? Why and how? A
related metaphorical issue surrounds the origins and destinations of intellectual
property. Where does knowledge come from, and how is it used? Copyright as
knowledge law may open a broader space for discussion and acceptance of the arguably
cumulative and collective character of intellectual works. The cumulative character of
creativity is often justified rhetorically but inadequately with a reference to a quotation
usually attributed to Isaac Newton: "If I have seen further, it is by standing on the
shoulders of giants."8 7 Both the quotation 8itself
and its historical context refer not to
8
creativity but to knowledge and scholarship.
The objects of knowledge law: Should the law be oriented to knowledge "goods"-that
is, what copyright refers to as works of authorship? Assuming that it should, how are
knowledge goods defined? Who defines them? Should knowledge law preserve the
law's current distinction between unprotectable abstract knowledge and protectable
expression?
Between intangible knowledge and tangible objects? All of these
(tangible and intangible, idea and expression) are forms of knowledge.
What
knowledge counts, and when? Is there a more productive classification to be found
among types of knowledge, such as distinctions among propositional knowledge
(knowledge of what), prescriptive knowledge (knowledge of how), and knowledge of
social facts and phenomena.89 What histories and contexts of knowledge matter?
What is the relationship between creativity and knowledge, assuming that creativity
should not be ejected or excluded from copyright, but re-established within it? These
are questions that copyright as creativity law has tried to avoid. Other areas of law
and practice that traffic in knowledge of different types-evidence law, securities law,
defamation law, and public funding of scientific research, for example-have
developed ways to differentiate among types of knowledge. 9 0 Should the law revisit

85.
See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
86.
See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 321 (2009) (focusing on the idea of an intellectual property as a right to exclude,
independent of the regulatory context in which that right exists).
87.
See, e.g., Ruth L. Okediji, The Regulation of Creativity Under the WIPO Internet
Treaties, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2379, 2410 (2009).
88.
The definitive account of the quotation and its pre-Newtonian origins is ROBERT K.
MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT (Univ. of Chi. Press 1993)
(1965). The affinity of patent scholars for Newton is well-known. See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer,
Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 29 (1991).
89.
See JOEL MOKYR, THE GIFTS OF ATHENA: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE KNOWLEDGE
ECONOMY 2-4 (2002). The categories demonstrate the possibility of constructing a meta-analysis
of knowledge that keys into various intellectual property disciplines. These are not the only
categories of knowledge or necessarily the right ones.
90.
Evidence law allows some knowledge to be considered by fact-finders, and it excludes
other knowledge. Securities law regulates the types of knowledge that may be shared among
buyers and sellers of securities. Defamation law punishes the public disclosure of certain kinds of
knowledge. Governments fund the production of what it believes to be desirable scientific and
artistic knowledge. For an interesting account of the relationships that law constructs among
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its long-standing reluctance to distinguish between types of knowledge objects in the
context of copyright, that is, the so-called non-discrimination principle, based on
intrinsic attributes of different types of knowledge, or the purposes of different types
of knowledge, or some other variables? 9 1 How should appreciation for the purely
aesthetic be situated in a legal vocabulary geared to knowledge? (The impurely
aesthetic, or crafts as well as arts, deserve notice as well.) Art as knowledge, that is,
as a way of knowing ourselves and the world, is a concept with a respectable historical
pedigree; the concept is92ripe for rehabilitation and elaboration in the context of
intellectual property law.
Controlling and sharing knowledge: What are the rights and obligations of those who
control knowledge and knowledge goods? How might rights and obligations vary across
different types of knowledge objects? Across different types of individuals, groups,
communities, and firms? Should knowledge law more specifically and consistently
address questions concerning social relationships constructed around knowledge,
concerning access to knowledge, and concerning conservation and storage of knowledge
and knowledge objects than intellectual property does today?
Some intellectual
property scholars have begun efforts to investigate those questions, 9 3 but they struggle
against the paradigm of copyright as creativity law.
Context: How should the law investigate the social, cultural, and material contexts,
including institutional and other economic contexts and systems, in which knowledge is
produced, stored, distributed, shared, accessed, and used? 9 4 When and how should
information about context inform conclusions drawn as to knowledge law issues
concerning access and control, and individual and communal or collective interests?
Integratingdisparate intellectual property doctrines: Could constructing a vocabulary of
copyright as knowledge law offer the potential to connect copyright doctrines more
thoughtfully to other intellectual property doctrines and related domains than is
typically possible today? Copyright as creativity law appears to have little to do with
patent law or trademark law, or with questions of privacy, public health, or traditional
knowledge (TK) and traditional cultural expression (TCE). Patent law, in particular, is
often characterized as the law of useful knowledge, and, as a result, it wrestles with its

apparently disparate areas of what I call knowledge law, see JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS,
SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996).
91.
See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
92.
See Carl H. Hamburg, Art as Knowledge, 12 COLLEGE ART J. 2 (1952); Harry Levin,
Art as Knowledge, in HARRY LEVIN, CONTEXTS OF CRITICISM (1957), at 2; Henry P. Raleigh, Art
as Communicable Knowledge, 5 J. AESTHETIC ED. 115 (1971); Ralph Ross, Art as Knowledge, 69
SEWANEE REV. 579 (1961).
93.
See Kapczynski, supra note 56, at 820; Menell, supra note 49, at 1018; Madhavi
Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2006). On the challenges facing access movements as they
confront authorship and creation narratives, see Jessica Silbey, Comparative Tales of Origins
and Access: A New Futurefor Intellectual Property, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
94.
Much of the contextual analysis that Professor Julie Cohen recommends with
respect to copyrightable creativity belongs here, as applied to knowledge. See Cohen, supra note
18. Institutional claims such as those raised by Professors Merges and Netanel, see supra notes
27-28 and accompanying text, can be assessed here as well. Professor Beebe answers his own
critique of the cultural hierarchies produced by intellectual property law by pointing to the
redemptive possibilities in what Professors Brett Frischmann, Katherine Strandburg, and I have
called commons in the cultural environment. See Beebe, supra note 15, at 994-87; Michael J.
Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, Constructing Commons in the
Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010). Professor Madhavi Sunder has rightly
urged reconsideration of questions of wealth, power, and status in the context of intellectual
property law generally, as part of an overall appreciation of the social relationships that property
law builds, and is built upon. See Sunder, supra note 93, at 315-19.
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own subject matter demons. 9 5 These fields all may be related as species of knowledge
law. A richer, common vocabulary might help policymakers make better sense of
overlaps and inconsistencies.

That is a non-exclusive list, and it lacks detail. 96 It is certainly
possible that these questions and issues might be raised in copyright
contexts and that the flow of scholarship, policymaking, and litigation
would produce a thin conceptual vocabulary that is no better than
what exists today. But it is difficult to imagine that such a vocabulary
would be worse, and given the freshness of the amateur art and digital
production issues noted in the Introduction, the time seems right to
explore the possibility.
The next two Parts initiate some of that exploration, taking
some of these broad ideas and making them more concrete. Part II
looks backward, taking up an older example of artistic borrowing that
offers an echo of the Associated Press's contemporary claim against
Shepard Fairey. The point of this example is that the connection
between amateur art and digital production is new, but it has
precedent in the history of art, and precedent that speaks to the
broader discussion of creativity and knowledge. A transition from
copyright as creativity law to copyright as knowledge law need not
represent a sudden departure from copyright's past-even its
nineteenth century "romantic authorship" past. That past offers some
potentially productive ways of looking at a knowledge future. Part III
looks at recent cases, suggesting that copyright as knowledge law may
offer some immediate and tangible benefits in the context of current
disputes.
II. FROM CREATIVITY TO KNOWLEDGE

It is hardly satisfying to claim that copyright could be
conceptualized as a species of knowledge law and conclude by
identifying questions, rather than answers, with respect to what that
might mean in practice. In this Part and the next, I offer some
examples from history and current experience, returning to the
questions of amateur art and digital production. How does copyright
as knowledge law contribute to a better understanding of those issues?
For a historical example, consider the Dutch painter Vincent
van Gogh. As one of the great painters of the nineteenth century, van
Gogh is sometimes cited as the model of the romantic author that
95.
See John R. Thomas, The Patentingof the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139,
1141 (1999).
96.
For more detailed justifications of inquiries into several of these issues, see Madison,
Notes on a Geography of Knowledge, supranote 30, at 2040.
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many scholars argue shaped copyright law over the last one hundred
years, a mostly solitary artistic genius who was inspired to create by
97
the glories of nature rather than the prospect of financial reward.
98
Van Gogh succeeded in producing a body of supremely creative work,
even if the paintings themselves sold badly until van Gogh was
discovered posthumously.
The Starry Night, painted in 1889,
exemplifies this theme; it is associated with van Gogh's direct,
emotional, and highly imaginative sense of nature. Van Gogh's letters
to his brother Theo offer the artist's own insights into his work:
[T]he sight of the stars always makes me dream in as simple a way as the black spots
on the map, representing towns and villages, make me dream. [ ] Why, I say to
myself, should the spots of light 9in
9 the firmament be less accessible to us than the
black spots on the map of France.

It may be surprising to many legal scholars, therefore, to learn
that van Gogh was a copyist, and a repeated and intentional copyist at
that, even during his later years, when he produced The Starry Night,
as well as other works that are now regarded as Expressionist
masterpieces. Some intellectual property scholars have noted one
particular feature of van Gogh's experience as a copyist: his reworking
in oils of Japanese woodcut prints by Utagawa Hiroshige. 10 0 The
lawyer and scholar Paul Geller, weaving van Gogh's borrowing from
Hiroshige into a discussion of the scope of copyright claims, notes that
van Gogh's studies of Hiroshige were unambiguously and creatively
new: "From one's prints to the other's studies, composition goes from
static to dynamic, coloration from muted to emphatic, and emotional
tone changes altogether." 10 1
97.
See BOYLE, supra note 90, at 91-92.
98.
Arthur Koestler famously wrote that "Einstein's space is no closer to reality than
Van Gogh's sky" as a way of expressing the sense that scientists and artists are alike in their use
and exploration of the human imagination. ARTHUR KOESTLER, THE ACT OF CREATION 252
(1964).
99.
Letter from Vincent van Gogh to Theo van Gogh, Arles (Monday, July 9 or Tuesday,
July 10, 1888), in VINCENT VAN GOGH: THE LETTERS (Leo Jansen, Hans Luijten & Nienke Bakker
eds., 2009), available at http://vangoghletters.org/vg/letters/let638fletter.html. The original of
The Starry Night is in the collection of the Museum of Modern Art in New York, which makes
the connection between the quotation in the text and this painting at Museum of Modern Art,
Vincent van Gogh, The Starry Night, http://www.moma.org/collectionbrowse-results.php?object_
id=79802 (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
100.
See Paul Edward Geller, Beyond the Copyright Crisis: Principlesfor Change, 55 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 165, 180 (2008); Paul Edward Geller, Hiroshige v. Van Gogh: Resolving
the Dilemma of Copyright Scope in Remedying Infringement, 46 J. COPYRIGHT. SOC'Y U.S.A. 39,
40 (1998).
101.
See Geller, Beyond the Copyright Crisis, supra note 100, at 180-81. Geller does not
hold himself out as an art critic, so his judgments should be taken as useful anecdotes. I have
seen van Gogh's studies and Hiroshige's prints side by side. While van Gogh clearly was engaged
in reworking, and his paintings are not copies of Hiroshige's prints, my own anecdotal reaction is
that it is difficult to say that van Gogh projects a dynamism, emotional tone, and sense of color

2010]

COPYRIGHT AS KNOWLEDGE LAW

I focus on a less-noted part of van Gogh's experience-his
copying of paintings by the French Realist Jean-Frangois Millet-and
on how van Gogh himself described the process and the meaning of
what he was doing. In van Gogh's words, a modern scholar may hear
echoes of a creative imagination at work, but van Gogh himself may
have thought that he was up to something else-something closer to
what I mean by offering as a copyright theme, and something that
may be helpful in considering amateur and digital art.
Millet himself was a celebrated and successful painter of the
mid-nineteenth century who was (and remains) well-known for his
true-to-life portraits of peasant life. 10 2 Millet painted oils, he drew,
and he produced woodcuts. Van Gogh, working twenty to thirty years
after Millet, copied his paintings and prints, over and over again.
Between 1889 and 1890, during van Gogh's residence in Saint-R6my
and around the same time that van Gogh painted The Starry Night, he
produced more than twenty paintings of countryside and peasant
scenes which he titled, in part, "After Millet" 103-that is, which
continued both van Gogh's long-standing fascination with Millet, and
the Realism found in van Gogh's earliest works.
What was van Gogh doing? Primarily, van Gogh's paintings
were studies. 10 4 Van Gogh's paintings are not reproductions of Millet's
paintings and prints, but, unlike his studies of Hiroshige, they are not
adaptations of one genre into another. Millet was a Realist; van Gogh
emulated his Realism. Subject, composition, tone, and coloration vary
between the two artists, but sometimes subtly. (Some of Millet works
that van Gogh copied were prints, in black and white; some of the
Millet works were paintings.) Some of van Gogh's studies vividly
evoke the Expressionism on display in The Starry Night; some less
so. 105 It is tempting to characterize van Gogh's use of Millet as Geller
characterizes van Gogh's use of Hiroshige, as a modern artist bringing
an older reference to life. That argument is seeded with notions of
creativity.
Van Gogh was creating.
He was also, and more
that is more impressive than that of Hiroshige. Once we set aside a subconscious sense that van
Gogh was a magnificent and original creator, my own sense is that van Gogh's studies are
neither more nor less creative than Hiroshige's prints.
102.

See ALEXANDRA R. MURPHY ET AL., JEAN-FRANCOIS MILLET: DRAWN INTO THE LIGHT

1 (1999).
103.
A helpful inventory of van Gogh's studies of Millet, with links to images of both
Millet's and van Gogh's paintings, is available at Vincent van Gogh: Influences,
http://www.vggallery.com/influences/millettmain.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
104.
See infra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
105.
The characterizations of van Gogh, Millet, and Hiroshige in this paragraph are
based on my own viewing of original works at the Van Gogh Museum in Amsterdam in October
2009.
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importantly, practicing. In his own words, he was learning, and he

was teaching.
Excerpts from van Gogh's contemporaneous letters to his
brother Theo are revealing:
What you say about the copy after Millet, The evening, pleases me. The more I think
about it the more I find that there's justification for trying to reproduce things by Millet
that he didn't have the time to paint in oils. So working either on his drawings or the
wood engravings, it's not copying pure and simple that one would be doing. It is rather
translating into another language, the one of colours, the impressions of chiaroscuro and
white and black. In this way I've just finished the three other 'times of the day' after the
wood engravings by Lavielle. It took me a lot of time and a lot of trouble....
[O]nce you have them you'll clearly see that they were done through a most profound
and sincere admiration for Millet. Then, even if they're criticized one day or despised as
copies, it will remain no less true that it's justifiable to try to make Millet's work more
accessible to the ordinary general public ...
This week I'm going to start on Millet's 'Snow-covered field' and 'First steps' in the same
format as the others. Then there'll be 6 canvases forming a series, and I assure you that
I've worked on them, these last three of the 'Times of the day', with much thought to
calculate the colour.
You see, these days there are so many people who don't feel made for the public but who
support and consolidate what others do. Those who translate books, for example. The
engravers, the lithographers. Take Vernier, for example, and Lerat. So that's to say
that I don't hesitate to make copies. If I had the leisure to travel, how I'd like to copy
the works of Giotto, this painter who would be as modern as Delacroix if he weren't
I haven't seen much of his
primitive, and who's so different from the other primitives.
10
work, though. But there's one who is consolatory. 6

And in another letter to Theo:
I can assure you that it interests me enormously to make copies, and that not having
any models for the moment it will ensure, however, that I don't lose sight of the figure.
What's more, it will give me a studio decoration for myself or another.
I would like also to copy the Sower and the Diggers.
There's a photo of the Diggers after the drawing.
And Lerat's etching of the Sower at Durand-Ruel's.
In these same etchings is the Field under the snow with a harrow. Then The four times
of the day, there are examples of them in the collection of wood engravings.
I would like to have all of this, at least the etchings and the wood engravings. It's a
study I need, for I want to learn. Although copying may be the old system, that
absolutely doesn't bother me at all. I'm going to copy Delacroix's Good Samaritan
too....
What I'm seeking in it, and why it seems good to me to copy them, I'm going to try to tell
you. We painters are always asked to compose ourselves and to be nothing but
composers.

Letter from Vincent van Gogh to Theo van Gogh, Saint-Rbmy-de-Provence (on or
106.
about Monday, Jan. 13, 1890), in VINCENT VAN GOGH: THE LETTERS, supra note 99, available at
http:/vangoghletters.org/vgllettersllet839/letter.html.

2010]

COPYRIGHTAS KNOWLEDGE LAW

Very well-but in music it isn't so-and if such a person plays some Beethoven he'll add
his personal interpretation to it-in music, and then above all for singing-a composer's
interpretationis something, and it isn't a hard and fast rule that only the composer
plays his own compositions.
Good-since rm above all ill at present, I'm trying to do something to console myself, for
my own pleasure.
I place the black-and-white by Delacroix or Millet or after them in front of me as a
subject. And then I improvise colour on it but, being me, not completely of course, but
seeking memories of their paintings-but the memory, the vague consonance of colours
that are in the same sentiment, if not right-that's my own interpretation.
Heaps of people don't copy. Heaps of others do copy-for me,1 0I7 set myself to it by chance,
and I find that it teaches and above all sometimes consoles.

And finally:
One must-it is true-believe in it a little from time to time in order to see it. If, for
myself, I wanted to continue, let's call it TRANSLATING certain pages of Millet, then in
order to prevent people, not criticizing me, I couldn't care about that, but bothering or
obstructing me under the pretext that I'm manufacturing copies-then among the
artists I need people like Russell or Gauguin to carry this task to a successful
conclusion, to make something serious of it. To do the things by Millet that you sent, for
example, the choice of which I consider completely right-I have scruples of conscience,
and I took the pile of photographs and I sent them unhesitatingly to Russell so that I
shouldn't see them again until I'd thought long and hard about it. I don't want to do it
before first having heard something of your opinion, then also that of certain others on
those that you'll soon10receive.
Without that I'd have scruples of conscience, a fear that it
8
might be plagiarism.

In light of this evidence, it is tempting to set a hypothetical
claim by Millet against van Gogh, and by van Gogh against a
downstream copyist, in the context of modern copyright law. Did van
Gogh infringe Millet?
(Precisely, would van Gogh's work have
infringed Millet's hypothetical copyrights?)
Is van Gogh's work
excused under the rubric of fair use? Has van Gogh produced versions
of Millet that are sufficiently original that they may be protected by
copyright as derivative works? My view is that the answers to these
questions are "no," "yes," and "yes," respectively, but, as is often the
case, reasonable minds may differ. In the late nineteenth century,
Millet was better known than van Gogh, and van Gogh's early
Expressionism had not yet found a critical audience. 109 Had van Gogh
107.
Letter from Vincent van Gogh to Theo van Gogh, Saint-R6my-de-Provence (on or
about Friday, Sept. 20, 1889), in VINCENT VAN GOGH: THE LETTERS, supra note 99, availableat
http://vangoghletters.org/vg/letters/let805/letter.html.
108.
Letter from Vincent van Gogh to Theo van Gogh, Saint-R6my-de-Provence
(Saturday, Feb. 1, 1890), in VINCENT VAN GOGH: THE LETTERS, supra note 99, available at
http://vangoghletters.org/vg/letters/let850/letter.html.
109.
Art historians studying van Gogh's copies of Millet appear united in their judgment
that van Gogh was both self-conscious and innovative in his use of Millet, well-known as an
artist, both for his own training, and for the purpose of eventually bringing his own paintings to
a popular audience. See generally CHARLES CHETHAM, THE ROLE OF VINCENT VAN GOGH'S COPIES
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been more successful in marketing his work, including his copies of
Millet, contemporary judgment (again, if modern copyright standards
were applied) might well have favored Millet, the creator, against van
Gogh, the copyist. Even a modern assessment does not clearly favor
van Gogh, though the twentieth century has been especially kind to
van Gogh the creator. If van Gogh were to prevail in modern terms,
and possess a valid copyright in his own work, the route to that result
would run through copyright as creativity law. The excerpt above
from Paul Geller's article, commenting on the relative creativity
observed in the work of van Gogh and Hiroshige,1 10 is representative
of that argument.
Van Gogh's own epistolary testimony suggests a somewhat
different and perhaps clearer route to vindicating van Gogh and to
understanding what he was doing-one that sounds, or at least
echoes, in copyright as knowledge law. It is possible to extract several
important points from the long quotations above.
The first point is that van Gogh himself may not have
conceived of his work as part of what has become known as the
authorship movement of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
There is no doubt that self-expression was among van Gogh's highest
priorities, yet there is a conspicuous absence of the philosophy,
grounded in literature, that characterized the author's work as a
distinct intangible thing deserving of legal protection."' Van Gogh
was hardly ignorant of artists' ethical interests; he went to some
lengths to distinguish his efforts from those of a copyist, or a
plagiarist. 11 2 Van Gogh regarded himself, after all, as an artist. 1 3 He
did not idealize or romanticize what was happening.
He was
practicing, and training, as artists do.
The second point is that van Gogh focused simultaneously on
himself as an artist, and on his audience.
Van Gogh was not
commercially successful during his lifetime, but that does not mean
that he was indifferent to (and did not paint in anticipation of) making
money from his work or having his work seen and understood. Note
the references in his letters to his use of Millet in the context of

IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF His ART (1976); CORNELIA HOMBURG, THE COPY TURNS ORIGINAL:
VINCENT VAN GOGH AND A NEW APPROACH TO TRADITIONAL ART PRACTICE (1996); see DEBORA
SILVERMAN, VAN GOGH AND GAUGUIN: THE SEARCH FOR SACRED ART 395-399 (2004).

110.
111.
112.
113.
1889).

See Geller, Hiroshige v. Van Gogh, supra note 100 and accompanying text.
See Woodmansee, supra note 57, at 444-47.
See supra note 108 and accompanying text (quoting letter dated Feb. 1, 1890).
See supra note 107 and accompanying text (quoting letter dated on or about Sept. 20,
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studying, learning, and teaching. 114 These are extensions of a broader
knowledge metaphor: van Gogh was seeking knowledge for himself,
and he was conscious of extending his knowledge to others. If his
words are taken at face value, then van Gogh regarded himself
unmistakably as an artist, but his was not art for art's sake, nor
creativity for creativity's sake. The bridge between van Gogh's
teaching himself and his teaching others is his self-conscious use of
the translation metaphor (another derivative of a broader knowledge
metaphor), and use of that metaphor in a field-specific or disciplinespecific way-as applicable to painters, composers, and those who
express art in different media: engravers, lithographers, and so on.
One might say that van Gogh regarded himself as the professional
teacher, and the "ordinary general public"11 5 as his students.
.One cannot say that this evidence alone would be enough to
excuse van Gogh's work as fair use, or to assure that van Gogh's work
would be entitled to copyright protection in its own right. A party's
testimony concerning the character of his own work may be suspect
for a variety of good reasons, even if reasons to doubt van Gogh's
Other considerations inform
sincerity are not apparent here.
copyright judgments, even within the creativity construct. Yet a
knowledge law framework seems more persuasive than a creativity
law framework in figuring out how this case should be resolved. Van
Gogh's letters lay out a multi-part matrix for assessing the legitimacy
of what van Gogh was doing-a "what" (a translation of prior work), a
"who" (a professional artist), a "how" (interpreting what others
produced and teaching it anew), and a "where" (an institutional
context)-that is not foreign to how contemporary scholars look at
creativity questions and that explicitly and easily maps on to a
knowledge framework.1 16 One might plausibly and persuasively argue
that van Gogh's work that "translates" Millet (to use van Gogh's
metaphor) is noninfringing and copyrightable, at least in this
hypothetical dispute, precisely because the evidence shows that it
suits that matrix.

114.
See id.
See supra note 106 and accompanying text (quoting letter dated Jan. 13, 1890). In
115.
the original, this is "grand public ordinaire," which has been translated by some as "great
general public."
116.
As that matrix is constructed from van Gogh's letters, a theme emerges-multiple
and overlapping flows of knowledge from sources to destinations-that echoes a similar theme in
modern psychological and sociological studies of creativity and innovation contexts. See generally
CSiKSZENTMIHLYI, supra note 34; JOHN SEELY BROWN & PAUL DUGUID, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF

INFORMATION 304 (2000) (describing "ecologies" of innovation and innovation in firms).
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At the end of Part I above, I offered a series of questions and
issues that policymakers, courts, and scholars may use to develop a
conceptual vocabulary that builds out the meaning of copyright as
knowledge law. More than one hundred years ago, Vincent van Gogh
was engaged in a version of that same exercise. A shift from copyright
as creativity law to copyright as knowledge law is not only historically
justified and normatively desirable. It is accessible even within the
authorship-enabled discourse of contemporary copyright in which
scholars have situated van Gogh.
III. CREATION, RE-USE, ACCESS, AND DISTRIBUTION AS KNOWLEDGE
LAW
Van Gogh and Millet are ancestors of Shepard Fairey and the
Associated Press, not in the sense that Fairey is entitled to van Gogh's
stature as an artist (or that the Associated Press is entitled to
Millet's), but instead in the sense that the conceptual relationship
between the two is structured in the same way. Van Gogh was
concerned that he would be regarded as a mere copyist with respect to
an artist of recognized stature, who van Gogh admired. Fairey is
accused of being a mere copyist with respect to a source that is
plausibly artistic.
This pattern is not new. Appropriation artists and conceptual
artists have been framing these issues for decades. 117 Software
developers face comparable questions when they engage in verbatim
copying of copyrighted computer programs in order to build
interoperable programs. 118 What has changed is the frequency with
which the legal system (and others) encounter the pattern, given the
rise of cheap digital technology and its widespread use, and the decay
of the conceptual vocabulary that the law has evolved to deal with the
pattern in light of technology and practice.
The previous Part
suggested that copyright as knowledge law offers a useful rubric for
117.
To some observers, Shepard Fairey may not be even a conceptual artist; he is, or at
least appears to be, a half-step removed from anyone equipped with a laptop computer and a
copy of Photoshop. He is not van Gogh because he is everyone, or anyone. To those critics, he is
not even Jeff Koons (an artist who is subject to his own share of skepticism), who has at times
been highly conscious of the "what is the same" and "what is different" basis of discipline-based
art. Because he uses digital tools that are broadly available and because he produces work that,
in the eyes of some, could be produced by anyone, Fairey appears to be attitude, rather than
meaning; he appears to be the spectre of amateur art. What happens if every person is a
potential Koons or Fairey? Or-more plausibly-what happens if we (courts, intermediaries,
audiences, and new artists) can no longer tell the difference? The answer may be that the
difference no longer matters. But lines still need to be drawn; choices need to be made.
118.
See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering,111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1608 (2002).
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evaluating van Gogh's defense against a hypothetical claim by Millet.
What might that rubric teach regarding Shepard Fairey, and
regarding amateurs who cannot claim even Fairey's stature as an
artist, let alone van Gogh's? 119
The knowledge law construct teaches not to emphasize the
distinction between professional and amateur art or artists, as such,
and not to favor not-for-profit knowledge contexts over for-profit
knowledge contexts (or the reverse) solely on the principle that
commercializing and commodifying art is a bad (or good) thing. It
teaches that creativity claims are not unimportant but may need to be
appreciated alongside other substantive claims regarding the "what?"
that copyright should value. The personal vision of an author or
creator, and the response of a reader or audience, may be best seen as
part of a flow of meaning embedded in various intangible and tangible
forms, including objects, rhetorics, and social and business practices.
In many fields, subject matter favored by outsiders, amateurs, and
In the
hobbyists evolves into new domains of professionalism.
twentieth century, rock 'n' roll music 120 and Pop Art 121 are two of the
better known domains of professional creativity with roots in outsider
or marginal artistic practice.
All of that is preliminary and tentative, and while Shepard
Fairey's work offers a timely opportunity to engage this conversation
between law and culture,122 this Article is not necessarily the best
place to conclude it, or even to continue it very far. At the time of this
writing, the Fairey litigation is still pending, and its disclosed record
is incomplete.
Even if the plaintiffs photograph contains copyrightable
elements, Fairey's work should be viewed as a form of fair use. Fairey
has created an entirely new subject and object of knowledge-Obama
as a subject of mythos (for his supporters), and an object of ridicule
(for his opponents).1 23 In art world terms, Fairey is practicing in a
tradition of art based on found material that extends from Duchamp
What might it make of service providers and technology developers who facilitate
119.
their activities? Though the question is beyond the scope of this Article, copyright as knowledge
law holds interesting possibilities for assessing copyright interests of Internet service providers
and hosts, libraries, archives, indexers, and search engines. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007).
120.

See PIERO SCARUFFI, A HISTORY OF ROCK MUSIC: 1951-2000 (2003).

See MARCO LINGSTONE, POP ART: A CONTINUING HISTORY (1990).
The conversational metaphor is borrowed from Peter Jaszi. Peter Jaszi, See Is There
122.
Such a Thing as Postmodern Copyright?, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 105, 106 (2009).
That statement encompasses not only Fairey's perspective, and that of his intended
123.
audience, but also the perspective of an objective observer. Which of these is relevant, and when,
is something that a knowledge critique of copyright would have to work out.
121.
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to Warhol, Koons, and Hirst. 124 In doctrinal terms, as a species of
knowledge law, Fairey's case is perhaps closest to Gaylord v. United
States,1 25 in which the owner of a copyright in a public sculpture sued
the United States Postal Service for using an image of the sculpture
on a stamp. The Court of Federal Claims found that the use
constituted a noninfringing fair use, in large part because the Postal
Service, having used a photograph of the statue that included some
snow-covering and having engraved the image in order to produce the
stamp, "changed Mr. Gaylord's sculpture to create a new, surrealistic
vision." 126 There is a hint in that phrase of a flow of meaning, of ways
of knowing the world, among the sculptor (Gaylord), the
intermediaries (the photographer, the Postal Service), and the
ultimate audience (stamp users). 127 Fairey seems to offer a claim that
resembles this argument, facilitating a flow of ways of knowing the
world, with respect to then-Senator Obama and his supporters and
critics. It is difficult to say more at this stage, either with respect to
Fairey's claim or with respect to the vision of fair use at which the
lower court in Gaylord hinted. To the extent that court spoke
indirectly in terms of copyright as knowledge law, it offered little
guidance to lawyers, scholars, future judges, and least of all
individuals, groups, and firms regarding how to express the fair use of
knowledge (or the absence of fair use) in terms of legal rhetoric. A
more evolved doctrine of fair use as part of knowledge law would
articulate in more detail the types of evidence that would be relevant
in establishing or rejecting the application of the doctrine-the
sources, practices, communities, and attributes of meaning that would
supplement the law's current focus on the plaintiffs and defendant's
works and their markets. Without that pragmatic detail, copyright as

124.
Jeff Koons's use of found material in his own art has been the subject two wellknown and widely-discussed opinions of the Second Circuit, the first finding that Koons's work
infringed, the second finding that it constituted fair use. Compare Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301
(2d Cir. 1992) (finding that Koons's "String of Puppies" sculpture infringed Art Rogers's
copyright in his photograph "Puppies"), with Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006)
(finding that Koons engaged in fair use when incorporating a portion of Andrea Branch's
photograph of a woman's legs into a larger collage). Peter Jaszi suggests that different
treatments of Koons may reflect evolving cultural understandings of conceptual art. See Jaszi,
supra note 122, at 116-17.
125.
85 Fed. Cl. 59 (2008), affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 595 F.3d 1364 (Fed.
Cir. 2010).
126.
Id. at 69.
127.
See supra note 92 and accompanying text (raising the question of art as knowledge
in the context of copyright as knowledge law).
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knowledge law runs a risk of being as conclusory and unhelpful in
practice as copyright as creativity law. 128
Fair use cases are obvious candidates for re-examination under
copyright as knowledge law. A more challenging and interesting
example is Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp.,129 in which
exact reproductions of public domain paintings, marketed as
transparencies and CD-ROMs, were held not to be copyrightable in a
case brought against a commercial copyist. The court concluded that
the plaintiffs works did not manifest the requisite originality as
derivative works, because there was no evident distinguishable
variation between the source and the reproductions:
In this case, plaintiff by its own admission had labored to create "slavish copies" of
public domain works of art. While it may be assumed that this required both skill and
point of the exercise was to
effort, there was no spark of originality-indeed, the
13 0
reproduce the underlying works with absolute fidelity.

The plaintiffs reproductions were, in effect, so good that they reflected
supreme technical skill, but no creativity.
Bridgeman has been the subject of extensive commentary, the
best of which has expressed strong sympathy for all of the multiple
interests at stake: museums and other art historical institutions that
have both commercial and scholarly interests at stake in producing
and distributing art reproductions, and scholars and the public who
ought not to have access to public domain works foreclosed because of
modern copyrights claimed in exact reproductions.1 31 Whether or not
the outcome is defensible on the merits, its rhetoric and
argumentative structure are discomforting. The rejection of "slavish
copying" as a basis for a copyright claim has support in precedent.
The reference stems in part from the rejection of a claimed copyright

The fragility of a thin conception of copyright as knowledge law is illustrated by the
128.
opinion of the Federal Circuit in Gaylord. The Court of Appeals specifically rejected the lower
court's finding that the stamp produced a distinct surrealistic character. In the court's words,
"[c]apturing The Column on a cold morning after a snowstorm--rather than on a warm sunny
day--does not transform its character, meaning, or message. Nature's decision to snow cannot
deprive Mr. Gaylord of an otherwise valid right to exclude." Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d
1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010). That quotation speaks in terms of copyright as creativity law. To
recast the court's judgment slightly, the defendant had not demonstrated the presence of
creativity in its work that was sufficient to outweigh the plaintiffs property right in his own
creativity.
25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) [hereinafter Bridgeman 1].
129.
130.
Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
[hereinafter Bridgeman I1].
131.
See R. Anthony Reese, Photographs of Public Domain Paintings:How, if at All,
Should We Protect Them?, 34 J. CORP. L. 1033 (2009) (proposing a limited sui generis property
right applicable to art reproductions, but expressing skepticism that such a right would pass
constitutional muster).
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on that ground in L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder132-but is both oddly
moralistic and inconsistent with credible artistic interests. 133 Would
framing the case in terms of copyright as knowledge law lead to a
more plausible and persuasive result, if not necessarily a different
one?
Bridgeman, as the court presented it, unfolded as follows. The
plaintiff began with two-dimensional works of fine art: paintings,
which were in the public domain. 134 Despite their public domain
status, copyright law commands a conceptual distinction of intangible
idea from intangible expression in each of those paintings. The latter
constitutes the creativity produced by the painting's author. By
creating high-quality reproductions of the paintings, Bridgeman
copied that intangible expression verbatim. The author's creativity
was entirely unchanged in the move from canvas to photograph and
CD-ROM. The change of medium made no creative difference. As the
court noted, "production of a work of art in a different medium cannot
by itself constitute the originality required for copyright protection."'' 35
That proposition is consistent with a bedrock copyright concept, that
the copyright exists independent of any material form in which the
work is fixed. 136 With no creativity, there was no originality; with no
originality, there was no copyright.
How might this be reframed? Begin with the original work of
authorship, which, implicitly, is unchanged in the transition from one
medium to another. It is characteristically assumed by copyright
lawyers and scholars and by judges in copyright cases that this work
of authorship is entirely intangible, though specific support for that
assumption appears neither in the Copyright Act nor in the United
States Constitution. 37 Copyright law does not define the concept of
132.

536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976).

133.
The moralistic tone carried by the phrase "slavish copying" is no accident. The first
reported use of the phrase took place in a district court opinion that granted an injunction on
unfair competition grounds against the producer of a "return post card folder" that copied an
identical product originated by the plaintiff. See Correct Printing Co. v. Ramapo River Printing
Co., 16 F. Supp. 573, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
134.
Presumably, most, if not all, of these painting were never protected by copyright in
the first place. The plaintiff relied in part on a certificate of registration in a work collecting its
digital images entitled Old World Masters I. BridgemanI, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 424.
135.
Bridgeman 11, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 196 (quoting Past Pluto Prods. v. Dana, 627 F.
Supp. 1435, 1441 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
136.
17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006) ("Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights
under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is
embodied.").
137.
See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Trespass-Copyright Parallels and the Harm-Benefit
Distinction, 122 HARV. L. REv. F. 62 (2009) ("Intangibles like works of authorship can be
extensively shared without damage to the owners, which is not as true of tangibles.").

20101

COPYRIGHT AS KNOWLEDGE LAW

the work of authorship. 138 It is, in fact, largely a product of the
authorship development of the nineteenth century, 139 meaning that its
current role in copyright analysis is at most statutory, rather than
constitutional. A work of authorship is embodied in material objects
called copies, which leads to the conclusion that works of authorship
are intangible and copies are tangible. Yet, there is no logical
inconsistency between the idea of a tangible work of authorship, that
is, a work that the author or creator has created with the hand rather
the head, and a copy that embodies that work. Even the definition of
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, which appears to require
separating intangible expressive features of three-dimensional and
two-dimensional graphical works from their physical forms, does not
140
exclude the possibility of tangible works of authorship.
Treat the original paintings as knowledge objects. Adopt some
of the sense of van Gogh's reference to teaching and learning through
his art as well as the premise that knowledge itself is embodied in
tangible as well as intangible things.1 4 1 Does transferring those
paintings into different media, in order to effect their publication and
distribution (and commercialization) to new or different audiences,
advance a related teaching and learning goal? It might be argued that
such a change of medium does precisely that; if so, the conclusion
would follow that there is copyrightable originality in Bridgeman's
transparencies. That conclusion would require rolling back not only
the rejection of the "slavish copying" principle cited in Bridgeman,
with its evocation of the idea that "slavish" copying is inherently
value-less, but also the dictum in Feist that originality consists of a
form of creativity. A less dramatic turn would take that argument to
the same conclusion that the district court reached in Bridgeman: that
Bridgeman owns no protectable copyright interest in its
transparencies. The judgment might rest not on the proposition that
there is no creativity evident in the transparencies, and instead might
rest on the proposition that the process of producing the
transparencies evidences valuable knowledge that belongs not in the
copyright system but perhaps-given its technical character-in the

138.
That omission is the source of growing anxiety among scholars. See Justin Hughes,
Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 576 (2005).
See Woodmansee, supra note 57. On the development of the concept of the "work of
139.
authorship" in the nineteenth century as the locus of copyright analysis, see Bracha, supra note
22.
shall
140.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) ("Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works' .
include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or
utilitarian aspects are concerned.").
141.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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patent system. Looking at Bridgeman as a case of knowledge law
142
could align it, in other words, with cases such as Baker v. Selden.
Selden's bookkeeping text was held to be uncopyrightable subject
matter, but Selden's bookkeeping method, the Supreme Court noted,
might have been entitled to a patent. 143 That conclusion would have
the added benefit of assuring Bridgeman and other producers of art
reproductions a return sufficient to justify their investment in this
product.
IV. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

I have argued that copyright is dominated by a conceptual
construct, copyright as creativity law, which has exhausted whatever
ability it may have had to supply lawyers and policymakers with a
vocabulary adequate to differentiate persuasively between the kinds of
things that copyright law should value and those things that copyright
law should not. This challenge is particularly evident in the context of
amateur art. Amateur creators are authors in copyright terms; they
are also users and consumers. The vocabulary of creativity limits the
ability of the copyright system to differentiate between plausible
claims of fair use and ordinary consumption, for example, and between
copyrightable and uncopyrightable production of new works. Scholars
have sought to refine creativity in copyright in a variety of ways. This
has offered a supplemental construct, copyright as knowledge law,
which offers a historically valid and normatively justifiable route to
developing
and supplying a better vocabulary altogether.
Surprisingly, at least some support for the proposal is found in the
writings of Vincent van Gogh, who is widely regarded as the kind of
creative genius to whom the system's creativity construct is
144
addressed.
Copyright as knowledge law offers risks and costs as well as
potential benefits. Is it feasible to adapt copyright as knowledge law?
Constitutional law might pose an obstacle. Feist puts originality front
and center in copyright law as a matter of constitutional law. As a
result of that case, it is difficult to conceive of originality expressed in
terms of knowledge rather than in terms of creativity. Yet the
constitutional provision that supports copyright law also supports
142.

101 U.S. 99 (1879).

143.
See id. at 103. The status of related, modern business method patents is under
review by the Supreme Court. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (limiting
scope of patentable subject matter in the business method context), petition for cert. granted sub.
nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
144.
See BOYLE, supra note 90.
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patent law, 145 and the latter is unambiguously a knowledge-driven
body of law. So long as the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution is read as an integrated statement, a reading that is
justifiable based on the most recent research into its origins, 146 the
Constitution should be no obstacle to my claim here. Artists and
artistic communities whose identities, discourses, and practices
depend heavily on explicit ideologies of creativity would face the
challenging (though hardly insuperable) task of articulating those
ideologies in terms of knowledge; lawyers, judges, and policymakers
who are engaged with those communities would face the same task.
At the same time, the existence of that challenge implies that there
should be an opportunity to disengage creativity from copyright.
Some scholars now argue that the breadth of creative practice
demands precisely such a careful approach to copyright law.147 Would
relying on copyright as knowledge law pose a threat of inscribing a
hierarchy of expression and information that would undermine, rather
than enhance, the normative benefits of knowledge? Perhaps.
Yet my argument does not require a return to an older,
hierarchical system.
Nor do I suggest that "everyman" or
"everywoman" or "collaboratives" and "collectives" cannot be sources
and stewards of knowledge in meaningful and legally significant
ways-or that anyone or any group necessarily is such a source or
steward. I do argue that in the current Feist-encouraged environment
of copyright as creativity law, law and digital culture lack the kinds of
markers to help identify and sort the teachers from the learners that
were easier to come by and interpret in the analog world of unique (or
more unique) artifacts-the sorts of markers that an artist (and art
lover) such as van Gogh may have taken more or less for granted.
Putting knowledge in the center of these issues offers policymakers
and scholars a number of potential advantages over a sole focus on
creativity. Because those advantages may or may not be realized, I
148
characterize them as implications.
145.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
146.
See Oliar, supra note 46.
147.
See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 22.
148.
Even if copyright as knowledge law were treated as a grand thought experiment, its
unexpected nature makes the exercise worthwhile. Knowledge bears thinking about, and
rethinking. Borges reported on "a certain Chinese encyclopedia entitled Celestial Emporium of
Benevolent Knowledge" which recorded that
animals are divided into (a) those that belong to the Emperor, (b) embalmed ones, (c)
those that are trained, (d) suckling pigs, (e) mermaids, (f) fabulous ones, (g) stray
dogs, (h) those that are included in this classification, (i) those that tremble as if they
were mad, (j) innumerable ones, (k) those drawn with a very fine camel's hair brush,
(1) others, (m) those that have just broken a flower vase, (n) those that resemble flies
from a distance.
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Copyright as knowledge law suggests the following
implications. The first is that it offers a natural foundation for
149
aligning individualistic perspectives on intellectual property law
with institutional perspectives. Those two perspectives are often
viewed as being in tension with each other, particularly if creative
people, framed as complex, autonomous beings, are contrasted with
firms, framed as economic constructs. 150 A useful integration of the
two perspectives situates individuals in an institutional context,
giving primacy to neither as an analytic starting point. Forms of
knowledge are often closely aligned with specific institutional settings.
Science, scientific research, scientists, and disciplines and
organizations dedicated to scientific research are among the best
known, as an example that is usually linked to patent law. Fine art,
fine artists, curators, art historians, and museums offer an example
that is linked closely to copyright. New and emerging institutions,
and dynamic institutions, are increasingly parts of the setting of
intellectual property law and policy.' 5' Copyright as knowledge law
opens the door to investigating and understanding their virtues and
drawbacks as actors in themselves.
The second implication of copyright as knowledge law is that it
opens the door to exploring the "who?" of copyright, along with the
related "how?" and "why?" of copyright, as part of a matrix of
questions that is coupled with a meaningful inquiry into the "what?" of
copyright. I began this Article with the argument that creativity
offers an unhelpful set of "what?" questions in copyright law, leading
to an equally unhelpful emphasis on "who?" questions to the exclusion
of other topics. 152
Knowledge as copyright's "what?" requires
investigating that "what?," rather than ignoring it.
The third and final implication of copyright as knowledge law
is that it enables legitimate inquiries into both the processes of
knowledge production and distribution (among other things) and into

Jorge Luis Borges, The Analytical Language of John Wilkins (1942), reprinted in OTHER
INQUISITIONS: 1937-1952, at 101, 103 (Ruth L. C. Simms trans., University of Texas Press 1964).
149.
See supra note 18 (describing individualistic perspectives found in the work of
Professors Benkler and Cohen).
150.

Compare ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL

RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES (2009) (offering a thorough defense of legal protection for
the spiritual dimension of human creativity), with Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The
Goldilocks Hypothesis: BalancingIntellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007
U. ILL. L. REV. 575 (2007) (describing the impact of intellectual property rights on the "make or
buy" decision that characterizes the boundary of the classic firm).
151.
See, e.g., Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 94 (proposing an
institutional framework for analyzing "cultural commons").
152.
See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
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knowledge products themselves.
Inquiries into the processes of
creativity have, until recently, been suspect, 153 and recent explorations
of the sources of creativity have tried, in large part, to peer into the
creator's soul, or at least into the creator's heart.1 54 As philosophy,
psychology, and sociology, this approach to source is interesting in the
abstract. As a foundation for law and policymaking, it is at least
incomplete, because it does not take account of other legitimate
interests at work in the copyright system, and at worst it is unhelpful,
because it runs the risk of focusing law and policy excessively on
outcomes that are internal to individuals and insufficiently on
outcomes that are external, in society. Copyright as knowledge law
should direct policymakers and analysts to focus on the external
manifestations of human behavior, both individually and collectively,
rather than on internal questions of motivation and belief.
Administratively, this simplifies the costs of copyright as a legal
system; policymakers, copyright litigants and judges can limit the
scope of expensive investigations into the psychic motivations for and
benefits of creativity as bases for copyright rules and judgments.
Normatively, it points to the benefits of knowledge law in terms of
making the world a better place as well as making all of us better
people.

153.
See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (describing how copyright law usually
treats the work itself as the best evidence of its creativity).
154.
See KWALL, supranote 150; Tushnet, supra note 22.

